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Abstract
Does y obtain under the counterfactual supposition that x? The answer to this question is
famously thought to depend on whether y obtains in the most similar world(s) in which x obtains.
What this notion of ‘similarity’ consists in is controversial, but in recent years, graphical causal
models have proved incredibly useful in getting a handle on considerations of similarity between
worlds. One limitation of the resulting conception of similarity is that it says nothing about what
would obtain were the causal structure to be different from what it actually is, or from what we
believe it to be. In this paper, we explore the possibility of using graphical causal models to resolve
counterfactual queries about causal structure by introducing a notion of similarity between causal
graphs. Since there are multiple principled senses in which a graph G∗ can be more similar to a
graph G than a graph G∗∗, we introduce multiple similarity metrics, as well as multiple ways to
prioritize the various metrics when settling counterfactual queries about causal structure.
1 Introduction
Suppose that you had your temperature taken, and that the thermometer correctly indicated a
healthy temperature of 37◦C (or 98.6◦F). What would have happened had the thermometer been
broken so that its reading was exactly .5◦C higher? Would your body temperature have been
different than it actually was? Would you have subsequently taken a pill to reduce your fever?
Inspired by Lewis (1973) and Stalnaker (1968), most philosophers think that the answers to
these questions can be determined by checking whether the closest possible world(s) in which the
thermometer is broken is/are worlds in which your body temperature is different, or is/are worlds
in which you take the pill. What does this closeness consist in? Most philosophers treat worlds
as close to the actual world to the extent that they are similar to the actual world, where what
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counts as similar varies with context. Although the question of what settles the degree of similarity
between possible worlds remains controversial, it is standardly thought that the similarity relation
must capture the way in which counterfactual dependence typically tracks causal dependence. For
example, given our knowledge of the way in which thermometers work, and of how people respond
when thermometers register slight fevers, the relevant notion of similarity should vindicate the claim
that the closest possible worlds in which the thermometer is broken may be worlds in which you
subsequently take a pill (since the thermometer’s appearance has a causal effect on whether you
take the pill), but may not be worlds in which your body temperature is different than it actually
is (since your body temperature is causally upstream from the thermometer’s appearance).
Lewis (1979) famously used a complicated system of weights and priorities to develop an account
of ‘similarity’ that delivers these results, but many philosophers—e.g., Hausman (1998) and Wood-
ward (2005)—have convincingly argued that Lewis’s account is inadequate for several reasons, chief
among which is its inability to rigorously establish definite similarity orderings.1 Meanwhile, some
other authors—e.g., Briggs (2012), Halpern (2016), Pearl (2009), and Woodward (2005)—have ar-
gued that graphical causal models can be used to develop a more precise account that does at least
as well at capturing our intuitions about counterfactual dependence. We agree with these authors.
Though the details of these accounts vary from one author to the next, we are impressed with their
general ability to capture counterfactual reasoning in a rigorous way.
There is, however, at least one important limitation to these authors’ accounts. They say nothing
about what would obtain were the causal structure to be different from what it actually is, or from
what we believe it to be. The basic issue is that a graphical causal model specifies how the worlds
that the causal model describes are more and less similar to each other, but it says nothing about
how the causal model itself is more or less similar to other causal models. Thus these accounts are
silent, e.g., with respect to how we should update our beliefs under the counterfactual supposition
that your body temperature causally depends on the thermometer’s appearance (rather than the
other way around). Should we still believe that whether you take a pill is causally downstream from
your body temperature? If you want an answer to this question, then you must look elsewhere.
In this paper, we explore the possibility of using graphical causal models to resolve counter-
factual queries about causal structure by introducing a notion of similarity between causal graphs.
Specifically, we aim to answer queries like the above by determining whether the counterfactual
graph that is most similar to the original graph is one in which taking a pill is causally downstream
from your body temperature. Since the causal structure of the world may be immutable, and since
we seldom, if ever, are in a position to manipulate the causal structure of the world, it may seem that
this project is valuable only insofar as it informs science fiction, or insofar as it quenches our natural
thirst for knowledge about how things would be different were the world to be causally different.
(After all, the primary reason that we value knowing what would happen were the thermometer
to report inaccurately is that thermometers sometimes do break, and we care about the very real
consequences of their breaking.) We must admit that some of our interest in these counterfactual
queries is driven by pure curiosity, but the more pragmatic members of our audience needn’t worry.
1The ambiguity of Lewis’s (1979) account is in part due to his desire to develop an account of similarity that doesn’t
make any reference to causation (in the hope of reducing causal dependence to counterfactual dependence). Like, e.g.,
Halpern (2016), Pearl (2009) and Woodward (2005), we have no ambition to reduce causal dependence to counterfactual
dependence.
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We are also driven by our desire to make progress on the practically important problem of how
agents should update their standing beliefs about causal structure when they learn that they are
incorrect.
It is clear from work at the intersection of psychology, epistemology, and artificial intelligence
that intelligent creatures like us often use qualitative beliefs about causal structure to organize
our quantitative beliefs about evidential and counterfactual (ir)relevance.2 When our beliefs about
causal structure play this role, we do not entertain alternate possible causal structures; rather, we
take a particular causal structure as given, and let it guide our evidential and practical reasoning.
In so doing, we open ourselves up to the possibility of learning something that conflicts with our
standing qualitative beliefs—e.g., when we initially believe that X causes Y and subsequently learn
that Y temporally precedes X—and we need a method of belief revision that is well-suited to this
kind of learning. In this setting, we submit that the agent should replace her belief in the original
causal graph with a belief in a new causal graph that is among the graphs most similar to the
original that are compatible with the new evidence.
Consider our attitudes towards the healthiness of foods. In order to make the world easier to
navigate, we often reason as though we’re certain that a particular food does (or does not) causally
promote heart disease. (This considerably simplifies our deliberation about whether to eat the
relevant food.) But when we learn later that we’re wrong (e.g., because our best science now tells
us that red meat consumption does causally promote heart disease), we need to know what causal
structure to accept. Our proposal is that we should accept whatever graph is closest to our prior
causal graph among the set of graphs that include the learned causal relationship between red meat
consumption and heart disease.
In order to develop a treatment of similarity that is up to the task at hand, we need to think
carefully about what information is contained within a causal graph. We will see in what follows
that causal graphs are used to represent how an agent’s beliefs about causal structure constrain
her beliefs about evidential relevance and counterfactual relevance, and that these two kinds of
constraints operate somewhat independently from each other. In order to ensure that our treatment
of similarity incorporates both considerations, we introduce an evidential similarity relation in
Section 2, a counterfactual similarity relation in Section 3, and then consider possible ways of
incorporating both kinds of similarity into one master concept in Section 4. We abstain from arguing
for any particular master concept of similarity because it seems that there may be some contexts
in which one master concept is appropriately deployed, and others where another is appropriately
deployed. But in Section 5, we do take stock of when it matters which concept we use—i.e., of when
(and when not) counterfactual queries about causal structure have the same answers regardless of
which potential master concept is deployed. We argue that the answers to these counterfactual
queries may stand on firmer ground than others because, unlike others, they do not depend on
whether we give more priority to evidential similarity or counterfactual similarity.
2For recent empirical work explicating the role that qualitative beliefs about causal structure play in guiding evidential
and counterfactual reasoning, see e.g. Ali, Chater and Oaksford (2011), Lagnado and Sloman (2002).
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2 Evidential Similarity
In order to say what accounts for the similarity between causal graphs, we need to first take stock
of what information is contained within a causal graph. Our first task is thus to identify the basic
properties that distinguish causal structures.
Given some set of variables, V, we define a causal structure over V as a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) over V—i.e., a set of directed edges (or arrows) over V that are arranged such that no
directed path forms a cycle, and where the directed edges are taken to represent direct causal
dependencies. For example, if H represents height, D represents diet, and I represents intelligence,
then the following DAG represents the causal structure according to which diet has a direct causal
influence on intelligence, and no other (direct or indirect) causal relationships obtain between the
variables in V.
H D I
One way of capturing the characteristic content of this particular causal structure is that it has
substantial implications for the evidential relationships between H, D, and I. For example, if this
really is the true causal structure (and if we haven’t omitted any common causes), then H and D
should be probabilistically independent. This is because there should be no correlation between the
respective values of two variables when there is absolutely no causal relationship between them.
The most powerful and widely accepted way of cataloging the evidential implications of a causal
structure is given by the Causal Markov Condition (CMC), a generalization of Reichenbach’s com-
mon cause principle. The CMC provides a general procedure for inferring probabilistic indepen-
dencies (such as the independence between height and diet) from DAGs, and also helps us narrow
down the set of DAGs that are compatible with a given probability distribution.3
One important aspect of the CMC is that it sometimes treats distinct DAGs as compatible with
the same probability distributions. To illustrate, consider the following causal structures, G and
G∗.
H D I H D I
According to the CMC, G and G∗ both imply that H is probabilistically independent of both
D and I, and allow for the possibility that D is correlated with I. But according to the CMC,
the direction of the causal dependence between D and I makes no difference with respect to the
probability distribution. Structures like G and G∗—i.e., structures that imply the same probabilistic
independencies—are known as Markov equivalent.
If we hope to explicate the notion of similarity between causal structures in a way that tracks
their role in evidential reasoning, it seems that there should be some dimension of similarity ac-
cording to which two Markov equivalent structures are always classified as maximally similar. More
generally, a natural approach to assessing the similarity between distinct causal structures is to
3Note that additional axioms are also commonly employed towards these ends, most notably the causal minimality and
causal faithfulness conditions (see Sprites et al., 2000).
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measure the extent to which they have the same implications regarding the evidential relationships
that obtain among the given variables. This motivates the following definition,
Definition 2.1 Fix a variable set V and let NP denote the cardinality of the set of all possible
conditional independencies that can hold among the variables in V. Given a causal structure G, let
PG denote the set of conditional independencies entailed by G and the CMC. Then we define the
‘evidential distance’ between two causal structures G and G∗ over V to be dE(G,G∗) =
|PG|∆|PG∗ |
NP
,
where ∆ is the symmetric difference.
dE(G,G
∗), or the evidential distance between G and G∗, simply counts the number of conditional
independencies that are entailed by one but not both of G and G∗, normalized by the total number
of possible conditional independencies that could hold between the variables in V.4
Intuitively, dE(G,G
∗) can be thought of as encoding the extent to which G and G∗ disagree
regarding the evidential relationships between the variables in V. For example, it will be zero if and
only if G and G∗ are Markov equivalent. To further illustrate, consider the basic structures
G1 : X → Y → Z, G2 : X ← Y → Z, G3 : X → Y ← Z
To calculate the evidential distance between them, we simply count how many probabilistic
conditional independencies they disagree on and divide by the total number of possible conditional
independencies, as below.5
G1 G2 G3
X⊥Y × × ×
X⊥Z × × X
Y⊥Z × × ×
X⊥Y |Z × × ×
X⊥Z|Y X X ×
Y⊥Z|X × × ×
This yields the result that dE(G1, G2) = 0 (as expected, since G1 and G2 are Markov equivalent)
and dE(G1, G3) =
1
3 = dE(G2, G3) since both G1 and G2 disagree with G3 about two of the six
possible independencies.
4One might be worried that the proposed definition of the evidential measure involves double counting, since it is always
possible to generate the implied probabilistic independencies by considering a subset of independencies that imply the full
set via the semi-graphoid axioms for conditional independence. For example, one might consider using only the ‘basic
independencies’ discussed by Forster, Raskutti, Stern and Weinberger (2017). Though this approach will work when one
is measuring the similarity between a DAG and one of its subgraphs, it will not work generally. This is because a DAG
will generally have multiple different sets of basic independencies, and which set one chooses sometimes makes a difference
to the value of dE . Thus, when evaluating dE we generally need to consider the full set of probabilistic independencies
entailed by the graph, although we do make the harmless simplification of ignoring symmetrized independencies (i.e., we
count only one of X ⊥ Y |Z and Y ⊥ X|Z.)
5Given X,Y, Z ∈ V, we write X⊥Y |Z to indicate that X is probabilistically independent of Y conditional on Z. X⊥Y
means that X and Y are unconditionally independent.
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3 Counterfactual Similarity
Of course, the characteristic content of a causal structure is not exhausted by its evidential impli-
cations. It is widely acknowledged that causal structure also plays a crucial role both in assessing
the veracity of counterfactuals and in predicting the outcomes of prospective interventions. To
illustrate, let BT represent body temperature, TF represent whether the thermometer properly
functions, TR represent the thermometer reading, and PC represent whether a fever-reducing pill
is subsequently consumed. The intuitive causal structure in this case is as below.
BT
TR
TF
PC
As we mentioned in the introduction, this DAG gives us a good handle on what counterfactually
depends on what in most contexts. For example, we know that both TR and PC counterfactually
depend on BT , but that TF does not counterfactually depend on BT . Similarly, as mentioned
before, we know that BT and TF do not counterfactually depend on TR, and PC plausibly does
counterfactually depend on TR.
In the interventionist framework there are two simple ways to account for these dependencies.
First, the CMC entails that the intervention on X can be associated only with variables that are
causally downstream from X, and counterfactual supposition plausibly corresponds to the suppo-
sition that one intervenes to set X to x.6 Second, we can think of a DAG as imposing a partial
counterfactual ordering on V, where Y comes directly after X in the ordering exactly when X is a
direct cause of Y , and where Y possibly counterfactually depends on X exactly when Y (directly
or indirectly) follows X in the partial ordering.7 Thus this graph imposes a counterfactual ordering
according to which BT and TF directly precede TR, BT and TF are not ordered, and PC directly
follows TR and indirectly follows both BT and TF .
We see now that DAGs not only have implications with respect to the evidential relationships
that obtain between the variables in V, but also imply constraints on the possible counterfactual
dependencies that hold between those variables. Just as two distinct DAGs can embody the same
evidential implications (e.g., when they are Markov equivalent), two distinct DAGs can embody
the same implications regarding the counterfactual dependencies that obtain between the given
variables. To illustrate, consider the following two causal structures.
6When we intervene to set X to x, we use some exogenous cause of X to set the value of X to x. For a full understanding
of interventions, see Pearl (2009) or Spirtes et al. (2000).
7We restrict ourselves to talking about possible counterfactual dependence because in cases where the causal faithfulness
condition fails, Y can follow X in the ordering without being sensitive to interventions on X.
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BT
TR
TF
PC
BT
TR
TF
PC
Call the structure on the left G and the structure on the right G∗. G∗ is identical to G except
for the fact that it includes an additional direct causal influence from BT to PC. This additional
causal relationship does not entail any new counterfactual dependencies, since PC already indirectly
follows BT in the counterfactual ordering implied by G. Thus, G and G∗ encode exactly the same
sets of possible counterfactual dependencies, and we can call them counterfactually equivalent.8
In section 2 we presented a method for evaluating the degree to which different causal structures
G and G∗ have the same evidential implications. An analogous method can be defined for evalu-
ating the degree to which G and G∗ are counterfactually similar. Just as we required that, from
the evidential perspective, Markov equivalent DAGs should be maximally similar, we require that
counterfactually equivalent DAGs should be maximally similar from the counterfactual perspective.
Definition 3.1 Fix a variable set V and let NC denote the cardinality of the set of all possible
counterfactual dependencies that can hold among the variables in V. Given a causal structure G, let
CG denote the set of possible counterfactual dependencies allowed by G and the CMC. Then we define
the ‘counterfactual distance’ between two causal structures G and G∗ over V to be dC(G,G∗) =
|CG|∆|CG∗ |
NC
.
Given two causal structures G and G∗ over a variable set V, dC(G,G∗) simply counts all those
possible counterfactual dependencies about which G and G∗ disagree and normalizes by the car-
dinality of the set of possible counterfactual dependencies among V. It immediately follows that
dC(G,G
∗) = 0 if and only if G and G∗ are counterfactually equivalent. To illustrate how dC mea-
sures the distance between causal structures and its relationship to dE , recall the basic structures
G1, G2, G3 from the previous section. The following table shows how we calculate the counterfactual
distance between these structures (where X < Y means that Y possibly counterfactually depends
on X).
G1 G2 G3
X < Y X × X
Y < X × X ×
X < Z X × ×
Z < X × × ×
Y < Z X X ×
Z < Y × × X
8It is easy to see that two DAGs can be counterfactually equivalent only if one is a subgraph of the other.
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The evidential and counterfactual distances between these structures is summarized as follows.
dE(−,−) dC(−,−)
G1, G2 0 1/2
G1, G3 1/3 1/2
G2, G3 1/3 2/3
This table helps us to see how evidential distance and counterfactual distance can come apart.
For example, G2 and G3 are equally counterfactually close to G1, but when it comes to evidential
distance, G2 is closer to G1 than G3 is close to G1. Because these two metrics are independent in this
way, if we settle counterfactual queries by minimizing evidential distance, we will not always arrive
at the DAG (or set of DAGs) that minimizes counterfactual distance. Likewise, if we minimize
counterfactual distance, we will not always arrive at the DAG (or set of DAGs) that minimizes
evidential distance. For example, if we start off believing X → Y → Z and then learn that, as a
matter of fact, Y → X, it’s easy to see that the evidentially closest DAG is X ← Y → Z (since it’s
Markov equivalent to the original). But it’s also easy to see that Y → X → Z is counterfactually
closer to the original graph than X ← Y → Z. This is because Y → X → Z permits Z to
counterfactually depend on X (as it did in the original graph) while X ← Y → Z does not.
This means that if we want to develop a notion of similarity that incorporates both kinds of
similarity, we need some way of integrating both kinds of consideration into one and the same
distance metric. In the next section, we introduce different ways of doing exactly this.
4 One Similarity to Rule Them All?
We are now ready to ask how evidential similarity and counterfactual similarity can be integrated
into some procedure for settling counterfactual queries—i.e., that provides a semantics for counter-
factuals whose antecedents specify counterfactual facts about causal structure, and that provides
agents with instruction who need to revise their qualitative beliefs about causal structure on the
basis of new conflicting evidence. This means constructing a procedures that identifies which DAGs
that satisfy some constraint (supplied by either the new evidence or the counterfactual antecedent)
are most similar to the original DAG. If we let G represent the original graph and let S represent
the set of the DAGs that are compatible with the new (counterfactual or evidential) constraint,
then the following three procedures are natural candidates.
1: First, find the set SE ⊆ S of structures in S that are evidentially closest to G, i.e. SE = {G′ ∈
S|dE(G,G′) = min
G′′∈S
dE(G,G
′′)}. Next, find the set SEC ⊆ SE of structures in SE that are
counterfactually closest to G, i.e. SEC = {G′ ∈ SE |dC(G,G′) = min
G′′∈SE
dC(G,G
′′)}. Return
SEC as the set of structures in S that are most similar to G.
2: First, find the set SC ⊆ S of structures in S that are counterfactually closest to G, i.e.
SC = {G′ ∈ S|dC(G,G′) = min
G′′∈S
dC(G,G
′′)}. Next, find the set SCE ⊆ SC of structures in
SC that are evidentially closest to G, i.e. SCE = {G′ ∈ SC |dE(G,G′) = min
G′′∈SC
dE(G,G
′′)}.
Return SCE as the set of structures in S that are most similar to G.
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3: Define the measure dα as a weighted average of dE and dC , i.e. dα(G,G
′) = (αE ·dE(G,G′))+
(αC · dC(G,G′)). Return the set Sα ⊆ S that minimizes this distance as the set of structures
in S that are most similar to G.
Informally, the procedures can be summarized as follows. The first two procedures are lexico-
graphic. They privilege either the evidential or the counterfactual content of causal structures as
more fundamental. According to the first procedure, one should first identify those structures whose
evidential implications are closest to G’s, and then break any ties by going with the structure(s)
that is/are counterfactually closest. The second procedure is the exact inverse—i.e., it isolates the
set of structures which are most similar to G from the counterfactual perspective and then breaks
ties by identifying which elements of that set are evidentially closest to G. While the first and sec-
ond procedures regard the evidential and counterfactual implications of a causal structure as more
fundamental, respectively, the third procedure allows agents to weigh counterfactual and evidential
considerations against one another in a more nuanced way—i.e., by taking the similarity between
two structures to be a weighted average of their evidential and counterfactual similarity.
The relationship between these procedures and the resolution of counterfactual queries is not
entirely clear. For example, one can develop the counterfactual semantics such that a given causal-
structure-counterfactual is true relative to the standards imposed by a particular procedure only
when the structural feature of its consequent is shared by all of the graphs returned by the procedure,
or, alternatively, only when the structural feature of its consequent is shared by some graph returned
by the procedure. Similarly, one can develop the norm of belief revision such that it is rationally
permissible to accept any of the graphs returned by the relevant procedure, or such that it is
rationally permissible to accept no particular graph when multiple graphs are returned. In this
paper, we do not intend to settle questions of this sort, and instead primarily focus on questions
about the similarity notion itself.
Upon putting these procedures on the table, it is immediately clear that what constitutes the
closest graph in which some constraint is satisfied will depend on which procedure is used, and on
how the weights are set when using the weighted procedure. Just consider our earlier example,
where an agent initially accepts X → Y → Z and then learns that Y → Z. If the standards are
set by the first procedure, the agent should come to accept that X ← Y → Z. This is because it’s
Markov equivalent to the original graph and satisfies the constraint, therefore leaving no ties to be
broken. On the other hand, if the standards are set by the second procedure, it can be shown that
there are multiple DAGs that are strictly counterfactually closer than this one—e.g., Y → X → Z—
and the evidential tie-breaker therefore cannot provide reason to favor X ← Y → Z. Similarly,
if considerably more weight is given to evidential similarity than counterfactual similarity, then it
will be rational to accept X ← Y → Z, but if considerably more weight is given to counterfactual
similarity, then it will be rational to accept some other graph.
Since there may be some contexts where it is reasonable to prioritize evidential similarity (e.g.,
when beliefs about causal structure function primarily to constrain an agent’s evidential probabilistic
judgments) and other contexts where it is reasonable to prioritize counterfactual similarity (e.g.,
when beliefs about causal structure function primarily to impose order on things), the truth-values
of causal-structure-counterfactuals, as well as rational belief updates about causal structure, may
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depend on the context at hand.9 Does this mean that there is no objective fact of the matter about
how the causal structure would be were some local feature of it different from what it actually is?
5 Whither Objectivity?
Even if each of the procedures from the last section is sometimes admissible, there may be an
objective answer to how any counterfactual query should be answered in a given context. In order
to establish this answer, we just determine which procedure should be used in the context at hand,
and then the objective fact of the matter is settled by this procedure. But still, it may be surprising
that the solutions to counterfactual queries about causal structure appear to depend on what we
value—i.e., whether we prioritize evidential similarity or counterfactual similarity—in a way that
“normal” counterfactual queries (or queries about the values of variables) do not.
In this section, we consider whether there are any specific types of counterfactual queries about
causal structure where the same results are returned no matter which procedure is used. When this
happens, just as with “normal” counterfactual queries, there is a context-invariant objective fact
of the matter about which causal-structure-counterfactuals are true, and about how agents should
revise their qualitative beliefs about causal structure.
We focus primarily on when the two lexicographic procedures agree because it can be easily
shown that the lexicographic procedures agree exactly when it doesn’t matter what non-extreme
weights are used in the weighted procedure.10 Thus we can check whether context plays a role just
by checking whether it matters which of the two lexicographic procedures is used. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to prove general results about when the lexicographic procedures agree, but we
identify three examples where they do agree that are interesting in their own right, and that may
themselves be suggestive about what can be proved in the future.
Case 1 (Collider Conflict): Let G1 be the basic collider structure
X
Y
Z
and suppose that we want to find the most similar causal structure in which Y has a direct
causal influence on Z (rather than vice-versa). According to either of our lexicographic pro-
cedures, the following structure is uniquely most similar to G1 amongst the set of DAG’s that
satisfy the given constraint.
X Y Z
9We are officially silent with respect to whether the solutions to counterfactual queries vary with context. Indeed, one
of us is sympathetic to the claim that counterfactual similarity should receive priority in every context.
10This is true because the lexicographic procedures return the same structures exactly when the intersection of eviden-
tially and counterfactually closest structures is non-empty, and any structure that minimizes both the counterfactual and
evidential distances will also minimize any weighted average of those distances.
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Case 2 (Adding an Arrow): Let G1 be the structure
X Y Z
and suppose that we want to find the most similar causal structure in which Y has a direct
causal influence on Z (rather than there being no causal relationship between them). Both
lexicographic procedures agree on a single closest structure amongst all those that satisfy the
given constraint. Specifically, they both return the chain structure
X Y Z
Case 3 (Disconnecting Two Variables): Let G1 be the chain structure
X Y Z
and suppose that we want to find the most similar causal structure in which Y and Z are
completely causally independent of one-another in the sense that neither causally influences
the other, and they have no common causes or effects. Both lexicographic procedures agree
on a single closest structure amongst all those that satisfy the given constraint:
X Y Z
The fact that these three cases exist shows that there is a noteworthy class of cases for which
it does not matter how we prioritize considerations of evidential and counterfactual similarity. In
these cases, we can say that there is an objective fact of the matter about what would happen were
the causal structure to be different in a sense that does not exist generally—namely, no matter
how considerations of evidential similarity and counterfactual similarity are prioritized, the most
similar graph(s) is/are the same. Whether there are actually contexts in which each of these
procedures should be used goes beyond the scope of this paper, so it is still possible to argue that
the resolution of every causal-structure-counterfactual does not vary with context (by arguing for
one of the lexicographical procedures). But since some practically minded individuals might think
there are some contexts that call for one prioritization, and others that call for another, we believe
that it is worth pointing out that there are some causal-structure-counterfactual queries that have
the same resolution no matter how things are prioritized.
6 Conclusion
We have explicated two ways in which causal structures can be similar, and three ways in which
these two notions of similarity can be integrated into a single master conception of similarity. We
do not defend any of these master concepts as universally correct, but we have shown that there is
a substantial range of cases in which they coincide. In future work we hope to explore
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1: When and whether there is principled reason to favor one master conception (or one system
of weights) over the alternatives.
2: When and whether any of these potential master conceptions can be used to assess the accuracy
of causal search algorithms in terms of similarity to the true causal structure.11
3: Whether any of these potential master conceptions can be used to define a procedure for
aggregating competing beliefs about causal structure in terms of finding the graph(s) that is
on average most similar to the individually accepted graphs (see e.g. Bradley, Dietrich and
List (2014)).
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